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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study is to provide a legal analysis of the duty on banks to comply with 
targeted financial sanctions issued by the United Nations Security Council. Targeted financial 
sanctions entail assets freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or other assets from being 
made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of targeted or “designated” persons and 
entities. Such targeted measures are increasingly being utilised for various different purposes 
– including as counter-terrorism and non-proliferation controls. 
 Such an analysis is primarily required because of the significant changes made to the 
targeted financial sanctions enforcement framework in South Africa by means of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017. This framework finally provides full coverage 
of South Africa’s various international obligations as they relate to targeted financial sanctions. 
However, the framework is also fragmented, necessitating that a holistic view be provided of 
the compliance requirements that exist in this regard. 
 This study further shows that these amendments are significant – both for accountable and 
reporting institutions and persons not falling within the scope of these terms. The extremely 
broad scope of the financing prohibitions, together with the various concomitant reporting 
obligations, results in an onerous area of compliance – specifically for banks and other financial 
services providers.  
 Lastly, special focus is placed on the primary obligation enabling compliance with targeted 
financial sanctions – namely the obligation to reasonably identify parties subject to targeted 
financial sanctions, as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. This requirement 
is especially problematic in the context of juristic clients, where convoluted ownership and 
control structures can easily be used to obfuscate the involvement of a sanctioned person. This 
study therefore also serves to provide a point of departure as to the steps that banks should take 
to reasonably ensure that they are not dealing, directly or indirectly, with a sanctioned party. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
The use of sanctions has long been a standard feature of international politics.1 These measures 
– usually consisting of economic, financial or other restrictions or embargoes – are functionally 
designed and applied to incentivise change.2 This can entail coercing a change in behaviour or 
policy; constraining proscribed activities; signalling opposition against a sanctioned target; or 
stigmatising them or others about the violation of an international norm.3 Current geopolitical 
events – including the escalating conflict between the United States and Iran; the nuclear 
stalemate on the Korean peninsula; and the on-going “war or terror” – have also resulted in 
sanctions increasingly being used as a form of “lawfare” – i.e. as a substitute for direct military 
action.4 
 Currently, the most prevalent form of sanctions applied for the above purposes are targeted 
in nature. Targeted sanctions are designed and implemented to affect only those parties 
(individuals, legal entities and other non-state actors) that are subject to the sanctioning 
measures, instead of an entire sector, region or jurisdiction, as used to be the case.5 This is 
typically done by subjecting the target to arms embargoes, travel bans and financial 
restrictions.6 In this way, collateral damage incidental to a general sanction regime can be 
minimised.7 Targeted sanctions are currently the most widely used enforcement mechanism by 
the United Nations (hereafter “the UN”) and other sanctioning authorities around the world.8 
 The scope of this study is focused on only one of these targeted measures: targeted financial 
sanctions. The term targeted financial sanctions means both asset freezing and prohibitions to 
prevent funds or other assets from being made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit 
of targeted or “designated” persons and entities.9 These measures therefore have the effect of 
completely isolating the target financially and economically. Many regard these drastic and 
highly invasive measures to be draconian or “Orwellian in nature” – compromising individual 
                                                     
1  See Hotton “Targeted sanctions: providing a solution to the issue of general sanctions” 2016 Creighton Int’l 
& Comp LJ 86 87-91 and Haass “Sanctioning madness” 1999 Foreign Affairs 74 74-77. For an overview of 
the history and development of international sanctions, see Carter “International economic sanctions: 
Improving the haphazard U.S. legal regime” 1987 Cal L Rev 1159 1168-1170, citing Fornara “Plutarch and 
the Megarian decree” 1975 Yale Classical Studies 213 213-214, 219-220 and Ellings Embargoes and World 
Power: Lessons from American Foreign Policy (1985) 17-18. 
2  Addis “Targeted sanctions as a counterterrorism strategy” 2010 TJICL 187 189. 
3  Biersteker, Eckert, Tourinho and Hudáková The Effectiveness of United Nations Targeted Sanctions: Findings 
from the Targeted Sanctions Consortium (2013) 10-12 and Giumelli Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: 
Explaining and Understanding International Sanctions after the End of the Cold War (2011) 32-35. 
4  See Dunlap “Lawfare today: a perspective” 2008 Yale J Int’l Affairs 146 146 and Tiefenbrun “Semiotic 
definition of lawfare” 2010 Case Western Reserve J Int’l L 29 31 et sec. Sanctions have always been closely 
linked to war as a measure intended to weaken the enemy. See Johnson “OFAC and the role of the three lines 
of defense” 2010 ACAMS Today 1 1. 
5  Hersey “No universal target: Distinguishing between terrorism and human rights violations in targeted 
sanctions regimes” 2013 Brook J Int’l L 1231 1241. 
6  See s 2.4 below. 
7  Hersey (n 5) 1242. See also s 2.2 below. 
8  Biersteker et al (n 3) 9. 
9  Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Glossary of the FATF Recommendations. See also s 2.4 below. 
 2 
freedoms and human rights.10 Yet, despite these objections, targeted financial sanctions are 
increasingly being utilised for various different purposes – including primarily as counter-
terrorism and non-proliferation controls. 
 The purpose of this study is to analyse the duty on banks (and similarly large and complex 
accountable institutions, as per schedule 1 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act11) to comply 
with targeted financial sanctions, within the South African context. To achieve this objective, 
an overview of the development, application and scope of targeted sanctions – and targeted 
financial sanctions in particular – is firstly provided. Against this background, the regulatory 
framework for the enforcement of targeted financial sanctions in South Africa is analysed in 
greater detail. This is specifically important considering the recent amendments to this 
framework affected through the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act.12 This analysis 
also serves to clarify the scope of the targeted financial sanctions-related obligations imposed 
on financial institutions. 
 The last section focuses on the primary obligation enabling compliance with targeted 
financial sanctions – namely the obligation to reasonably identify parties subject to targeted 
financial sanctions, as well as those acting on their behalf or at their direction. Although it is 
simple enough to determine whether a client is sanctioned, it is significantly more challenging 
to determine whether such a client is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a sanctioned 
party. This is especially the case with juristic clients, where convoluted ownership and control 
structures can easily be used to obfuscate the involvement of a sanctioned person. This section 
therefore serves to provide a point of departure as to the steps that banks should take to 
reasonably ensure that they are not dealing, directly or indirectly, with a sanctioned party. 
  
                                                     
10  See Bekink “A dilemma of the twenty-first century state: Questions on the balance between democracy and 
security” 2005 AHRLJ 406 421 and Lumina “Counter-terrorism legislation and the protection of human rights: 
a survey of selected international practice” 2007 AHRLJ 35. 
11  38 of 2001. 
12  1 of 2017. 
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CHAPTER 2: OVERVIEW OF TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS 
2 1  The United Nations Security Council 
In terms of chapter VII of the UN Charter, the United Nations Security Council (hereafter “the 
UNSC”) has the authority to impose measures to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.13 This chapter is triggered by a finding by the UNSC that there is a threat to the peace, 
a breach of the peace or an act of aggression, whereupon the UNSC may decide what measures 
are to be employed to give effect to its decisions.14 
 Such measures include the issuance of international sanctions. Sanctions under article 41 
encompass a broad range of enforcement options that do not involve the use of armed force.15 
These generally include trade embargoes;16 financial restrictions;17 diplomatic sanctions;18 
suspension of cooperation with a third country; boycotts of sporting or cultural events; flight 
bans; and restrictions on admission.19 Such measures are to be employed to give effect to the 
UNSC’s decisions and resolutions and the UNSC may call upon the UN member states to apply 
such measures. 
Since 1966, the UNSC has established 30 sanctions regimes, each varying in terms of the 
measures adopted and the goals pursued.20  
 
2 2  The development of targeted sanctions 
The sanctions regimes implemented by the UN historically entailed broad-based or 
comprehensive restrictions. These restrictions not only targeted the government of a country, 
but also all natural and juristic persons within the jurisdiction, broadly prohibiting transactions 
and other forms of economic engagement.21 
 However, towards the end of the Cold War it had become apparent that the use of such 
                                                     
13  art 39.  
14  There are no limits on what such measures could be. See Powell “Terrorism and the separation of powers at 
the national and international level” 2005 SAJCJ 151 158. 
15  However, the use of force is not excluded completely. Per art 42, the UNSC may take action “by air, sea, or 
land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security” should it consider that 
measures provided for in art 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate. 
16  E.g. general or specific trade restrictions or arms embargoes. 
17  E.g. freezing of funds or economic resources, prohibitions on financial transactions, or restrictions on export 
credits or investment. 
18  E.g. the expulsion of diplomats, the severing of diplomatic ties, or the suspension of official visits. 
19  art 41. These measures are aimed at affecting “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of 
rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”. See also Biersteker et al (n 3) 15-16. 
20  These include in Southern Rhodesia; South Africa; the former Yugoslavia (2); Haiti; Iraq (2); Angola; 
Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia and Eritrea; Eritrea and Ethiopia; Liberia (3); the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo; Côte d’Ivoire; Sudan; Lebanon; the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea); Iran; Libya 
(2); Guinea-Bissau; the Central African Republic; Yemen; South Sudan; and Mali; as well as against ISIL 
(Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban. See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information. 
21  Boulden and Charron “Evaluating UN sanctions: new ground, new dilemmas, and unintended consequences” 
2010 Int’l LJ 1 3. 
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comprehensive measures had unintended and unavoidable adverse consequences.22 This was 
particularly true for the innocent and most vulnerable segments of society within a sanctioned 
jurisdiction, who often bore the brunt of the impact of trade embargoes and other economic 
restrictions.23 These measures also greatly complicated the work of humanitarian agencies; 
inhibited the productive capacity of the sanctioned country in the long-term; had a severe effect 
on neighbouring countries and the major economic partners of the target; frequently defeated 
their own purpose by provoking a patriotic response against the international community and 
the UN; and often conflicted with the UN’s own development objectives.24 UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali summarised these challenges as follows: 
 
“Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument. They raise the ethical question of 
whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of 
exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of 
their subjects.”25 
 
To address this challenge, the UNSC issued targeted sanctions for the first time in 1992. The 
aim of these new measures was to isolate and pressure the political leadership of Libya to turn 
over individuals suspected of involvement in the bombing of Pan American flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland and the Union de Transports Aeriens flight 772 on its way to Paris.26 Also 
described as “smart” sanctions, these measures only focused on or targeted specific leaders, 
decision-makers and their principal supporters, instead of the general population.27 The scope 
of these sanctions could therefore be significantly narrowed – and their intensity increased.28 
In this way, collateral damage and the negative humanitarian impact of the measures could be 
greatly reduced.29  
This new ability to directly target individuals and non-state actors proved to be highly 
effective. Targeted sanctions soon became the political “tool of choice” of the UNSC.30 
                                                     
22  Boutros-Ghali Supplement to an Agenda for Peace (1995) par 70. See also Magnusson “Targeted sanctions 
and accountability of the United Nations Security Council” 2008 ARIEL 35 39-43. 
23  Hufbauer and Oegg “Targeted sanctions: a policy alternative?” 2000 Law and Policy in International Business 
11 11-12. 
24  Boutros-Ghali (n 22) par 70. 
25  Boutros-Ghali (n 22) par 70. 
26  Biersteker “Targeted sanctions and individual human rights” 2009 Int’l J 99 99. 
27  Biersteker et al (n 3) 9 and Hersey (n 5) 1241. 
28  Hersey (n 5) 1259-1260. 
29  Addis (n 2) 192 and Biersteker et al (n 3) 9. Although targeted sanctions do not have the same degree of 
unintended adverse consequences as broad-based sanctions, the use thereof is not without controversy. Apart 
from being draconian in terms of both nature and impact, it has been shown that the use of targeted financial 
sanctions in particular may result in an increase in corruption and criminality; the strengthening of 
authoritarian rule; the diversion of resources; and negative humanitarian consequences. See Biersteker et al (n 
3) 17. They may also have unintended consequences for the sanctioning country – see Crozet and Hinz 
“Friendly fire: The trade impact of the Russia sanctions and counter-sanctions” 2016 Kriel Working Paper 
2059 8-27, 29-31. 
30  Boulden and Charron (n 21) 7 and Magnusson (n 22) 35-36. 
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Consequently, during the 1990s, the UN established more sanctions regimes than ever before.31  
 
2 3  Application of targeted sanctions to combat terrorism and proliferation  
There are currently 14 on-going UN sanctions regimes, consisting solely of targeted 
measures.32 Through these measures, the UN proscribes persons or entities against whom 
member states must take specific actions specified in the resolutions adopted by the UNSC.  
The UN currently applies targeted sanctions in support of various objectives. These include 
the political settlement of conflicts (including asset recovery); the pursuit of individuals for 
legal prosecution; efforts to stop human rights violations; and the enforcement of the terms of 
peace agreements.33 However, the extent to which these measures are applied for the above 
purposes are eclipsed by their application for two primary objectives: Targeted sanctions have 
become synonymous with the combatting of terrorism and the financing thereof, as well as the 
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.34 
 
2 3 1  The combatting of terrorism and terrorism financing 
Although the use of targeted sanctions is the most notorious of the UNSC’s mechanisms against 
terrorism,35 it has become a significant – if not the dominant – feature of modern anti-terrorism 
regimes.36  
 Terrorism-related targeted sanctions originated through UNSC resolution 1267 (1999), 
which initially imposed a limited air embargo and asset freeze on the Taliban.37 Over time the 
regime evolved and these measures were extended to include a targeted asset freeze, travel ban 
and arms embargo against designated individuals and entities associated with the terrorist 
organisation. 
 Subsequent resolutions systematically expanded the application of targeted financial 
sanctions to also target Al-Qaida and ISIL (Da’esh). Also included was any undertaking owned 
or controlled, directly or indirectly, by any designated person or entity, or by persons acting on 
their behalf or at their direction,38 as well as any other individuals, groups, undertakings and 
                                                     
31  See Annan “‘We the Peoples’: The role of the United Nations in the 21st century” 2000 Millennium Report of 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations A/54/2000 49. 
32  See https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information. Each regime is administered by a sanctions 
committee chaired by a non-permanent member of the UNSC. 
33  See Biersteker (n 26) 100; Addis (n 2) 188-189 and Biersteker et al (n 3) 9. 
34  The term "weapons of mass destruction" includes chemical, biological and nuclear-radiological weapons, as 
well as the means to deliver them. 
35  See Tzanakopoulos “Sharing responsibility for UN targeted sanctions” 2015 Int'l Org LR 427 429-441; Bothe 
“Security Council's targeted sanctions against presumed terrorists: the need to comply with human rights 
standards” 2008 JICJ 541 541-544; Ciampi “Individual remedies against Security Council targeted sanctions” 
2007 Italian YB Int’l L 55 55-57 and Powell (n 14) 42. 
36  Roach “A comparison of South African and Canadian anti-terrorism legislation” 2005 SACJ 127 148. 
37  UNSCR 1267 (1999) was adopted unanimously on 15 October 1999 in response to the situation 
in Afghanistan. The UNSC designated Osama bin Laden and his associates as terrorists and established 
a sanctions regime to cover individuals and entities associated with Al-Qaida, Osama bin Laden and/or 
the Taliban, wherever located. 
38  See the “Interpretive Note to Recommendation 6” in the FATF recommendations (n 62) s E. 
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entities associated with them.39 
 Terrorism-related sanctions were further strengthened through UNSCR 1373 (2001),40 
which is aimed at ensuring that the respective territories of member states are not abused for 
purposes of the financing of terrorism.41 The resolution requires that all members: 
• prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;42  
• criminalise the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of 
funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be 
used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, to carry out terrorist acts;43  
• freeze without delay funds and other financial assets or economic resources of persons 
who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the 
commission of terrorist acts;44 and 
• prohibit their nationals or any persons and entities within their territories from making 
any funds, financial assets or economic resources or financial or other related services 
available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of persons who commit or attempt to 
commit or facilitate or participate in the commission of terrorist acts.45  
 
Targeted sanctions under UNSCR 1373 (2001) are possible on a broader basis than UNSCR 
1267 (1999). Firstly, suspects or groups need not necessarily be associated with Al-Qaida, the 
Taliban or ISIL (Da’esh) under this regime. Secondly, the resolution also allows for the 
designation of individuals or groups as considered necessary to prevent and suppress the 
financing of terrorist acts. Lastly, these designations are made at a national or regional level. 
UNSCR 1373 (2001) therefore establishes a second and parallel listing system to UNSCR 1267 
(1999). 
 The application of targeted sanctions in the counter-terrorism context is not only aimed at 
restricting the activities and financial means of terrorist organisations. The Financial Action 
Task Force has identified the following additional indirect benefits: 
 
• “[D]eterring non-designated parties who might otherwise be willing to finance terrorist 
activity; 
• exposing terrorist financing “money trails” that may generate leads to previously unknown 
terrorist cells and financiers; 
                                                     
39  See UNSCR 1267 (1999), 1988 (2011), 1989 (2011), 2253 (2015) and their successor resolutions. The 
designation criteria under the ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida sanctions regime are set out in par 2-4 of UNSCR 
2368 (2017). See also https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267#further%20information. 
40  UNSCR 1373 (2001), titled “Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts”, was passed 
on 28 September 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. 
41  par 2(a)-(g). 
42  par 1(a). 
43  par 1(b). 
44  par 1(c). This prohibition also applies to “entities owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons; 
and of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of such persons and entities, including funds 
derived or generated from property owned or controlled directly or indirectly by such persons and associated 
persons and entities”.  
45  par 1(d). 
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• dismantling terrorist financing networks by encouraging designated persons or entities to 
disassociate themselves from terrorist activity and renounce their affiliation with terrorist 
groups; 
• terminating terrorist cash flows by shutting down the pipelines used to move terrorist related 
funds or other assets; 
• forcing terrorists to use more costly and higher risk means of financing their activities, which 
makes them more susceptible to detection and disruption; and 
• fostering international co-operation and compliance with UNSC obligations.”46 
 
2 3 2  Non-proliferation 
The UNSC has a two-tiered approach to non-proliferation. The first is a global approach, under 
UNSCR 1540 (2004) and its successor resolutions.47 These are broad-based provisions which 
affirm that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and their means of 
delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The resolution prohibits states 
from providing any form of support to non-state actors that attempt to acquire nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons, including proliferation financing. Proliferation financing is the act of 
“providing funds or financial services which are used, in whole or in part, for the manufacture, 
acquisition, possession, development, export, transhipment, brokering, transport, transfer, 
stockpiling or use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and their means of delivery and 
related materials (including both technologies and dual-use goods used for non-legitimate 
purposes), in contravention of national laws or, where applicable, international obligations”.48 
 The second approach is country-specific, under UNSCR 1718 (2006), 2231 (2015) and their 
(future) successor resolutions. These are currently country-specific resolutions against the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) and the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (Iran).49 
 There are two primary categories of non-proliferation-related measures. The first consists 
of restrictions on activities that support proliferation efforts or programs, e.g. trade embargoes 
or restrictions on trade in use-dual goods.50 UNSCR 1540 (2004) requires states to establish 
“appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and 
controls on providing funds and services related to such export and trans-shipment such as 
financing”.51 
                                                     
46  Financial Action Task Force (FATF) International best practices: Targeted financial sanctions related to 
terrorism and terrorist financing (Recommendation 6) (2013) par 4. 
47  UNSCR 1540 (2004), titled “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, was passed on 28 April 2004. 
48  Financial Action Task Force Combating Proliferation Financing: A Status Report on Policy Development and 
Consultation (2010) 11. 
49  See also Eckert “United Nations non-proliferation sanctions” (2010) International Journal 69 70 et sec. 
50  Dual-use goods are items that have both commercial and military applications. Common examples include 
radio navigation systems, nuclear power technologies, weapons components, or items used in the manufacture 
of a component of a weapon. 
51  par 3(d). 
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 The second includes targeted financial sanctions centred on actors of concern.52 Countries 
are required to freeze immediately the funds, other financial assets and economic resources 
which are in their territories or under their jurisdiction that are owned or controlled, directly or 
indirectly, by such persons or entities and must ensure that no funds or other assets and 
economic resources are made available to them. 
 
2 4  Scope of targeted sanctions 
As already alluded to above, targeted measures generally include three types of restrictions: 
arms embargoes, travel bans and financial sanctions. 
 Arms embargoes prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of all types of weapons 
and ammunition and related materiel to designated individuals and entities.53 
 Travel bans limit the mobility of designated individuals by preventing entry into the 
territories of member states, as well as transit through their territories, regardless of the method 
of entry, the point of entry or the nature of the travel documents used, if any, and despite any 
permissions or visas issued by the state in accordance with its national regulations.54 
 Targeted financial sanctions have been included in all but one of the current UN sanctions 
regimes.55 These measures include both asset freezing and prohibitions to prevent funds or 
other assets from being made available, directly or indirectly, for the benefit of designated 
persons and entities.56  
 The purpose of an assets freeze is to deny listed individuals, groups, undertakings and 
entities the means to support terrorism or proliferation.57 The assets freeze therefore applies to 
all assets owned or controlled by the target, including funds that derive from property that they 
own or control, directly or indirectly, or that are owned or controlled by persons acting on their 
behalf or at their direction. The assets freeze further applies to “financial and economic 
resources of every kind”.58  
 In addition to the assets freeze, no further funds, financial assets or economic resources of 
any kind may be made available to targeted persons for so long as they remain subject to the 
applicable measures. Such financial or economic resources should be understood to include 
assets of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, movable or immovable, actual or 
                                                     
52  DPRK-related designations are made by both the UNSC and the Security Council 1718 Committee. The 
applicable criteria for designation are specified in UNSCR 1718 (2006), 2087 (2013), 2094 (2013) and 2270 
(2016). Iran-related designations are made by the UNSC only, as the former 1737 Committee has been 
terminated following the adoption of the UNSCR 2231 (2015). The applicable criteria for designation are 
specified in UNSCR 2231 (2015). 
53  UNSCR 1390 (2002) par 2 and United Nations Arms Embargoes: Explanation of Terms par 1-8, approved by 
the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on 24 February 2015. 
54  UNSCR 2161 (2014) par 1(b) and United Nations Travel Bans: Explanation of Terms par 1-5, approved by 
the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on 24 February 2015. 
55  Guinea-Bissau, established pursuant to UNSCR 2048 (2012). 
56  FATF Glossary (n 9). 
57  UNSCR 2161 (2014) par 1 (a) and United Nations Assets Freeze: Explanation of Terms par 1-3, approved by 
the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee on 24 February 2015. 
58  par 5. See also par 17 for an extensive definition of “funds and other financial assets”. 
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potential.59 
 Due to the incredibly broad scope of these financial restrictions, it is clear that their impact 
is significant for the designated party.  
 
2 5  Conclusion 
The overview provided above has shown that targeted sanctions – and targeted financial 
sanctions in particular – are highly effective measures that will be increasingly utilised by the 
UNSC and other sanctioning authorities for the foreseeable future.  
 It is also clear that the scope of the financial restrictions being imposed on the targeted 
parties is exceptionally broad – setting numerous compliance obligations and enforcement 
requirements. In the following chapter these requirements are analysed in greater detail from a 
South African regulatory perspective. 
 
  
                                                     
59  par 18. 
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CHAPTER 3: TARGETED FINANCIAL SANCTIONS ENFORCEMENT 
South Africa has developed and adopted various regulatory instruments to enable the 
enforcement of targeted financial sanctions, in accordance with its obligations as a UN member 
state. However, before these instruments are assessed in more detail, it is important also to 
provide an overview of the international standards that inform this framework – namely those 
of the Financial Action Task Force. 
 
3 1  The Financial Action Task Force 
South Africa’s primary targeted financial sanctions compliance obligations are naturally 
founded in the UNSC resolutions themselves, as discussed above. These resolutions bind South 
Africa as a UN member state and have been incorporated into domestic legislation, as discussed 
in more detail below. 
 However, a second source of obligations originates from South Africa’s membership of the 
Financial Action Task Force (hereafter “the FATF”).60 The FATF is an international standards-
setting body that works to promote effective legal, regulatory and operational measures to 
combat money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other threats to the international 
financial system.61 It does so through inter alia the issuance of standards.  
 
3 1 1  The FATF recommendations 
The FATF International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of 
Terrorism & Proliferation (commonly known as the “FATF recommendations”62) sets out a 
comprehensive and consistent framework of measures which countries should implement to 
combat money laundering, terrorism financing and proliferation. The recommendations are 
internationally endorsed as the global standard against money laundering and terrorist 
financing. They are aimed at increasing transparency and enabling countries to successfully 
take action against the illicit use of their financial systems. More than 190 countries around the 
world subscribe to these standards. 
                                                     
60  Its members currently consist of 37 member jurisdictions and two regional organisations, representing most 
major financial centres in all parts of the globe. South Africa has been a member state since 2003 and remains 
as the only African member state. Other members include Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong (China), Iceland, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, the European Commission, and the Gulf Co-
operation Council. 
61  fatf-gafi.org/about/. See also Hugo and Spruyt “Money laundering, terrorist financing and financial sanctions: 
South Africa's response by means of the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 1 of 2017” 2018 TSAR 
227 232-234.  
62  fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF%20Recommendations%202012.pdf. First 
published in 1990, the FATF standards initially contained 40 recommendations pertaining only to money 
laundering. However, in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, the FATF adopted 9 additional 
recommendations relating to terrorism financing – known as the “FATF IX Special Recommendations”. 
Thereafter, the FATF standards were commonly jointly referred to as the “40+9 recommendations”. In the 
current version, first published in 2012, the 9 recommendations relating to terrorism financing have been 
subsumed into the other 40 recommendations – thereby once again resulting in 40 recommendations in total. 
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 Of the 40 recommendations, the following two specifically relate to targeted financial 
sanctions: 
 
Recommendation 6: Targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorist financing 
Recommendation 6 pertains to targeted financial sanctions related to terrorism and terrorism 
financing. It requires the following: 
 
“Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions regimes to comply with United Nations 
Security Council resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of terrorism and terrorist 
financing. The resolutions require countries to freeze without delay the funds or other assets of, 
and to ensure that no funds or other assets are made available, directly or indirectly, to or for the 
benefit of, any person or entity either (i) designated by, or under the authority of, the United 
Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, including in 
accordance with resolution 1267 (1999) and its successor resolutions; or (ii) designated by that 
country pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001).” 
 
Recommendation 6 is applicable to all current and future successor resolutions to UNSCR 1267 
(1999) and any future resolutions which impose targeted financial sanctions in the context of 
terrorism and terrorism financing. 
The FATF further identifies several requirements for the development of a comprehensive 
targeted financial sanctions compliance regime at a national level.63 Only the most pertinent 
requirements will be dealt with here.  
Firstly, countries should require that all natural and legal persons within the country freeze 
or otherwise restrict the funds or other assets of designated persons and entities. Such funds or 
assets include “all funds or other assets that are owned or controlled by the designated person 
or entity, and not just those that can be tied to a particular terrorist act, plot or threat; those 
funds or other assets that are wholly or jointly owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by 
designated persons or entities; and the funds or other assets derived or generated from funds or 
other assets owned or controlled directly or indirectly by designated persons or entities, as well 
as funds or other assets of persons and entities acting on behalf of, or at the direction of, 
designated persons or entities”.64  
Secondly, no person or entity may make available “any funds or other assets, economic 
resources, or financial or other related services, available, directly or indirectly, wholly or 
jointly, for the benefit of designated persons and entities; entities owned or controlled, directly 
or indirectly, by designated persons or entities; and persons and entities acting on behalf of, or 
at the direction of, designated persons or entities”.65  
                                                     
63  See the “Interpretive note to recommendation 6” in the FATF recommendations (n 62) s A-E. 
64  par 6(a). 
65  par 6(b). However, it should be possible to authorise certain types of fees, expenses and service charges, or 
for extraordinary expenses, in accordance with the procedures set out in UNSCR 1452 (2002) and any 
successor resolutions. On the same grounds, countries should authorise access to funds or other assets, if 
freezing measures are applied to persons and entities designated by a (supra-) national country pursuant to 
UNSCR 1373 (2001) and as set out in UNSCR 1963 (2010). 
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The scope of these two requirements clearly mirror the scope of the targeted financial 
sanctions issued by the UNSC – i.e. assets freezing and restrictions on further access to funding.   
Lastly, countries should have appropriate mechanisms to communicate the designations of 
persons or entities by the UNSC;66 require reporting to competent authorities of any assets 
frozen or actions taken in compliance with the prohibition requirements of the relevant 
resolution and ensure that such information is effectively utilised by the competent 
authorities;67 and ensure that the rights of bona fide third parties acting in good faith are 
protected when implementing these obligations.68 
 
Recommendation 7: Targeted financial sanctions related to proliferation 
The second applicable recommendation is recommendation 7, as it relates to non-proliferation-
related targeted financial sanctions. The recommendation requires the following: 
 
“Countries should implement targeted financial sanctions to comply with United Nations Security 
Council resolutions relating to the prevention, suppression and disruption of proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and its financing. These resolutions require countries to freeze 
without delay the funds or other assets of, and to ensure that no funds and other assets are made 
available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of, any person or entity designated by, or under 
the authority of, the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations.” 
 
The requirements in this regard are substantively similar to those relating to terrorism and 
terrorism financing-related targeted measures.69 However, the focus of recommendation 7 is 
on preventive measures that are necessary and unique in the context of stopping the flow of 
funds or other assets to, and the use of funds or other assets by proliferators.70 These measures 
are not intended to replace other measures or obligations under international treaties or 
resolutions relating to non-proliferation – whether in the context of a criminal, civil or 
administrative proceedings.71  
 Recommendation 7 is currently applicable to only two country-specific regimes, namely 
those relating to North Korea and Iran.72 
  
                                                     
66  par 6(c). This should also include mechanisms to communicate de-listings and unfreezing. See also par 12. 
67  par 6(d). 
68  par 6(e). 
69  See the “Interpretive note to recommendation 7” in the FATF recommendations (n 62) s B-D. 
70  par 2. 
71  An extensive system of international non-proliferation controls and obligations currently exist in this regard, 
which includes (1) a framework of non-proliferation treaties – in particular the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention; (2) 
international organisations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); (3) international 
export control regimes such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Missile Technology Control Regime; and 
(4) national authorities responsible for administering and enforcing export controls, including export licensing, 
customs and law enforcement authorities, and intelligence agencies. 
72  See s 2.3.2 above. 
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3 1 2  FATF mutual evaluations 
The FATF recommendations are important for several reasons. Firstly, although the 
recommendations apply at a governmental level and should inform the adoption of domestic 
legislation, these standards are also important indicators for financial institutions and 
designated non-financial businesses and inform the controls and requirements that they adopt. 
 Secondly, the FATF measures effect implementation of FATF standards through on-going 
peer reviews.73 These “mutual evaluations” entail an in-depth assessment of a country’s 
technical compliance with the FATF recommendation, as well as the overall effectiveness of 
its anti-money laundering and combatting of the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) regime.74 
The outcome of this assessment provides critical assurance to the international financial 
community that a country’s financial system and institutions are safe, trustworthy and resistant 
to abuse by criminals.75 This assurance is specifically important in the context of international 
trade and finance, as well as other forms of cross-border payments. In such instances, 
international correspondent banks must be satisfied that dealings with South African financial 
institutions will not expose them to undue and unacceptable regulatory risks in their own 
jurisdictions. Where this assurance cannot be provided, such financial institutions will typically 
require greater compensation for services rendered to South African institutions, in return for 
tolerating the higher risk posed by these relationships. These higher costs are ultimately passed 
on to the client, affecting inter alia the profitability of international trade and finance.76  
Ultimately, if the risk posed by South African institutions is deemed to be unacceptable, 
South Africa could be “de-risked”. De-risking is a relatively recent phenomenon where 
business relationships with financial institutions in certain jurisdictions are terminated or 
restricted on the basis that the risk posed by such relationships is too difficult or expensive to 
manage and mitigate effectively.77 The result of de-risking is almost complete isolation from 
the international financial system, with obviously dire consequences in terms of trade, 
economic growth and financial inclusion. In this sense, a positive evaluation by FATF is 
closely linked to South Africa’s access to international banking and finance, as well as the costs 
associated with such relationships.78 
Per the FATF’s mutual assessment methodology, the effectiveness of targeted financial 
sanctions is assessed in terms of the development of a holistic sanctions regime, as well as how 
it is applied in different sectors.79 An effective anti-terrorism system must therefore enable the 
identification of terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist support networks and these must 
                                                     
73  See fatf-gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate). 
74  See Financial Action Task Force Methodology for assessing technical compliance with the FATF 
Recommendations and the Effectiveness of AML/CFT systems (2013). 
75  Hugo & Spruyt (n 61) 234. 
76  Hugo & Spruyt (n 61) 234. 
77  See Durner and Shetret Understanding Bank De-risking and Its Effects on Financial Inclusion (2015) Global 
Centre on Cooperative Security, Oxfam and World Bank Brief: De-risking in the Financial Sector (2017). 
78  A FATF mutual evaluation of South Africa is currently underway, as at the time of writing. 
79  See Immediate Outcome 10 (“Terrorists, terrorist organisations and terrorist financiers are prevented from 
raising, moving and using funds, and from abusing the NPO sector”) of the FATF mutual assessment 
methodology (n 74). 
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be deprived of the resources and means to finance or support terrorist activities and 
organisations. Immediate Outcome 10 furthermore specifically requires the following: 
 
“This includes proper implementation of targeted financial sanctions against persons and 
entities designated by the United Nations Security Council and under applicable national or 
regional sanctions regimes. The country also has a good understanding of the terrorist financing 
risks and takes appropriate and proportionate actions to mitigate those risks, including measures 
that prevent the raising and moving of funds through entities or methods which are at greatest 
risk of being misused by terrorists. Ultimately, this reduces terrorist financing flows, which 
would prevent terrorist acts.”80 
 
3 2  South African regulatory framework 
Several laws have been promulgated to incorporate the FATF standards into South Africa’s 
domestic regulatory framework. These laws include the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 
(POCA),81 the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA),82 as amended by the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Amendment Act (FICAA);83 and the Protection of Constitutional 
Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act (POCDATARA).84 
 The sections below will only focus on those legislative instruments that provide for 
compliance obligations and requirements relating to targeted financial sanctions – i.e. 
POCDATARA – as it relates to the enforcement of terrorism and terrorism financing-related 
targeted financial sanctions – and FICA, as amended by FICAA – insofar as these acts 
incorporate targeted financial sanctions obligations into the South African regulatory 
framework. 
 
3 2 1  Protection of Constitutional Democracy Against Terrorist and Related Activities 
Act 
After a lengthy and difficult process, the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorist and Related Activities Act85 was signed into law on 14 February 2005 and came into 
force on 20 May 2005.86  
 
 
                                                     
80  Immediate Outcome 10 (n 79). 
81  121 of 1998. 
82  38 of 2001. 
83  1 of 2017. 
84  33 of 2004. 
85  33 of 2004. 
86  See Lumina (n 10) 46-47. Before this point, terrorism legislation in South Africa was largely inherited from 
the apartheid era. Such legislation included the Suppression of Communism Act 44 of 1950; Unlawful 
Organisation Act 34 of 1960; General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963; Terrorism Act 83 of 1967 and the 
Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. The government therefore decided to enact a new omnibus act addressing 
inter alia terrorism and terrorism financing on a broader basis, instead of amending the existing laws. See also 
Bekink (n 10) 417. 
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Overview of the act 
As per the long title and preamble to the act, POCDATARA was promulgated inter alia to: 
provide for measures to prevent and combat terrorist and related activities; provide for an 
offence of terrorism and other offences associated or connected with terrorist activities, 
including Convention offences; and, give effect to the various international instruments to 
which South Africa is a party, as listed in the preamble.87 These international instruments were 
therefore officially incorporated into South African municipal law by virtue of the act.88 
The act creates a host of different offences, structured into three categories: the offence of 
terrorism and offences associated or connected with terrorist activities (“specified offences”);89 
Convention offences;90 and other offences.91  
In terms of the act, the offence of terrorism was no longer limited to terrorism against the 
South African government or population.92 In this regard the act aligned the South African 
regulatory framework to global trends, expectations and requirements. Furthermore, South 
Africa is under both a general duty to combat terrorism and a specific duty to bring to trial 
perpetrators of terrorism, wherever perpetrated.93 The act therefore also extended the 
jurisdiction of South African courts to include the above offences wherever they are 
committed.94 
 
Targeted financial sanctions 
The act was the first legislative mechanism through which effect was given to UNSC targeted 
sanctions – albeit only to targeted measures relating to terrorism and terrorism financing.95 The 
act set several compliance obligations in this regard. 
 
                                                     
87  The preamble lists several instruments that South Africa is either already a party to or to which it desires to 
become a party to. See also S v Okah 2015 2 SACR 561 (GJ) par 5 and s 2.3.1 above. 
88  See S v Okah 2015 2 SACR 561 (GJ) par 7. 
89  s 2 and 3. “Specified offences” is an umbrella term that captures a broad range of offences, as defined in s 1. 
These offences are based on the 12 UN anti-terrorism conventions, as well as the AU Convention. See 
Bogaards v S 2012 1 All SA 376 (SCA) where the court held that “specified offence” can only be read as 
referring to an act that was committed after POCDATARA commenced. For a more detailed discussion of the 
various specified offences, see De Koker (ed) South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 
(SI 19 2018) 4.04-4.07. 
90  s 4-10.  
91  s 11-14. These include offences relating to the harbouring or concealment of persons committing specified 
offences; a duty to report the presence of persons suspected of intending to commit or having committed an 
offence and the failure to so report; offences relating to hoaxes; and offences relating to the threatening or 
otherwise inducing of another person to commit an offence. 
92  Such a limitation used to exist in terms of s 54 of the Internal Security Act 74 of 1982. See also Bekink (n 10) 
417. 
93  See S v Okah 2018 (1) SACR 492 (CC) par 36. 
94  See S v Okah 2018 1 SACR 492 (CC) par 26, 35. As the preamble acknowledges, “terrorist and related 
activities are an international problem, which can only be effectively addressed by means of international 
cooperation”. See also Roach (n 36) 129. 
95  Financial Intelligence Centre Guidance Note 6: On terrorist financing and terrorist property reporting 
obligations in terms of section 28A of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001) 7. See also 
s 2.3.1 above. 
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i. Notification 
Firstly, section 25 provides a mechanism to communicate the UNSC designation of persons or 
entities, by requiring the following: 
 
“25. The President must, by Proclamation in the Gazette, and other appropriate means of 
publication, give notice that the Security Council of the United Nations, under Chapter VI1 of the 
Charter of the United Nations, has identified a specific entity as being –  
(a) an entity who commits, or attempts to commit, any terrorist and related activity or 
participates in or facilitates the commission of any terrorist and related activity; or 
(b) an entity against whom Member States of the United Nations must take the actions specified 
in Resolutions of the said Security Council, in order to combat or prevent terrorist and related 
activities.”96 
  
Per this section, the president does not have a discretion to decide whether to give notice of 
such a resolution.  
In terms of section 26, every proclamation issued in terms of section 25 must be tabled in 
parliament for “its consideration and decision”. Parliament may thereupon take such steps as it 
may consider necessary. It appears that parliament therefore has some discretion in ratifying 
the section 25 proclamation. However, Powell argues that “the appearance of discretion may 
be illusory”, as it is unclear what “steps” are truly available to parliament in this regard, and as 
it is highly unlikely that section 26 allows parliament to amend the list.97 
 
ii. Offences relating to the provision of property, financial or other service or economic 
support 
Section 4 creates various offences relating to the financing of the broad range of specified 
offences identified in the act.98 Although these offences relate to the financing of terrorism 
broadly, each also specifically includes the making available of property or provision of 
financial services or any form of economic support to an entity identified in a notice issued 
under section 25. This section is therefore aimed at giving effect to the assets freezing and 
financial restriction requirements of the UNSC targeted financial sanctions.  
The first offence relates to the making available of property,99 financial or other service or 
                                                     
96  Per s 1(1)(v), the term “entity” includes “a natural person, or a group of two or more natural persons (whether 
acting in the furtherance of a common purpose or conspiracy or not), or a syndicate, gang, agency, trust, 
partnership, fund or other unincorporated association or organisation, or any incorporated association or 
organisation or other legal person, and includes, where appropriate, a cell, unit, section, sub-group or branch 
thereof or any combination thereof”. 
97  Powell (n 14) 153. 
98  See n 89 above. See also S v Okah 2018 (1) SACR 492 (CC) par 28-29 for an analysis of the purpose of s 4 
and the financing of terrorism as a derivative crime. 
99  The act defines "property" as “money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing, and 
includes any rights, privileges, claims and securities and any interest therein and all proceeds thereof”. See s 
1, with reference to s 1 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998. The definition is similar to the 
FATF definition of “property”, as per the FATF glossary (n 9) – i.e. “assets of every kind, whether corporeal 
or incorporeal, moveable or immoveable, tangible or intangible, and legal documents or instruments 
evidencing title to, or interest in such assets”. 
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economic support. In terms of section 4(1), a person commits an offence if he engages in certain 
commercial acts or transactions in relation to property or services, intending that the property, 
financial or other service or economic support be used, or while he knows or should have 
known or suspected that they will be used (directly or indirectly, in whole or in part) to facilitate 
the commission of a “specified offence”100; for the benefit of, or on behalf of, or at the direction 
of, or under the control of an entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the 
commission of a specified offence; or for the benefit of a specific entity identified in a notice 
issued by the president under section 25. The list of relevant commercial acts or transactions is 
extensive.101  
The second offence relates to any form of facilitation, financial or other service or economic 
support that would result in the availability of property. The specific prohibition reads as 
follows: 
 
“4(2). Any person who, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, and by any means or  
(a) deals with, enters into or facilitates any transaction or performs any other act in connection 
with property which such person knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected to 
have been acquired, collected, used, possessed, owned or provided – 
i. to commit or facilitate the commission of a specified offence; 
ii. for the benefit of, or on behalf of, or at the direction of, or under the control of an 
entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the commission of a 
specified offence; or 
iii. for the benefit of a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President 
under section 25 of POCDATARA; or 
(b) provides financial or other services in respect of property referred to in paragraph (a), 
is guilty of an offence.” 
 
Lastly, section 4(3) criminalises certain acts in respect of property that was acquired, collected, 
used, possessed, owned or provided to commit specified offences or to benefit terrorists or 
terrorist organisations. The specific prohibition reads as follows: 
 
“4(3). Any person who knows or ought reasonably to have known or suspected that property is 
property referred to in subsection (2)(a) and enters into, or becomes concerned in, an arrangement 
which in any way has or is likely to have the effect of – 
(a) facilitating the retention or control of such property by or on behalf of – 
(i) an entity which commits or attempts to commit or facilitates the commission of a 
specified offence; or 
(ii) a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President under section 25 of 
POCDATARA; 
(b) converting such property; 
(c) concealing or disguising the nature, source, location, disposition or movement of such 
property, the ownership thereof or any interest anyone may have in the property; 
                                                     
100  See n 89 above. 
101  See s 4(1)(a)-(i). 
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(d) removing such property from a jurisdiction; or 
(e) transferring such property to a nominee, 
is guilty of an offence.” 
 
These offences are committed whether or not: 
• the terrorist activity that is directly or indirectly supported by the financing activity 
actually occurs;102 
• the actions of the accused actually enhance the ability of any person to commit a specified 
offence;103 or 
• the accused knows or ought reasonably to have known about or suspected the specific 
offence that may be committed.104 
 
Any person who has reason to suspect that any other person intends to commit or has committed 
such an offence must report as soon as reasonably possible such suspicion to any police 
official.105 A person required to make such a report may continue with and carry out any 
transaction to which such a suspicion relates, unless directed not to do so by an authorised 
police official.106 
 Read together, these three offences broadly prohibit the provision of financial services, 
dealings in property and any form of economic support to a person designated by the UNSC as 
subject to terrorism-related targeted financial sanctions – in addition to the general prohibitions 
against terrorism financing, as discussed above. These offences carry a maximum penalty of a 
R100 million fine or 15 years’ imprisonment.107 It should lastly be noted that these offences 
are applicable to designations under section 25, whether or not the proclamation by the 
president was ratified by parliament.108 
 
iii. Assets freezing 
Lastly, in terms of section 23, a high court may, on ex parte application by the national director 
of public prosecutions to a judge in chambers, make an order prohibiting any person from 
engaging in any conduct, or obliging any person to cease any conduct, concerning property in 
respect of which there are reasonable grounds to believe that the property is owned or 
controlled by or on behalf of, or at the direction of any entity which has committed, attempted 
to commit, participated in or facilitated the commission of a specified offence; or a specific 
entity identified in a notice issued by the president under section 25.109 Such an order may 
                                                     
102  s 17(2). 
103  s 17(3)(a). 
104  s 17(3)(b). 
105  s 12(1). 
106  s 12(5)-(6). 
107  s 18(1)(c). 
108  Powell (n 14) 153. 
109  s 23(1). 
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include an order to freeze any such property.110 It is enough for the assets to be controlled by a 
designated entity – it is not required that the assets also in fact be used for terrorist purposes. 
In this regard, the South African law goes beyond the requirements of the 1999 Convention for 
the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.111 
 
3 2 2  Financial Intelligence Centre Act (prior to the 2017 amendments) 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA)112 was the primary legislative instrument 
promulgated to implement appropriate AML/CFT controls and requirements into the domestic 
regulatory framework. As such, the act was – and remains – central to South Africa’s effort to 
comply with the FATF recommendations.113 
 
Overview of the act 
As per its long title, the act firstly aimed to establish the Financial Intelligence Centre (hereafter 
“the centre”) to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorist and related activities.114 
The centre is a statutory body operating outside the public service but within the public 
administration as envisaged in section 195 of the constitution.115 It is registered as a national 
public entity in terms of the Public Finance Management Act.116  
 Per section 3 of the act, the principal objective of the centre is to “assist in the identification 
of the proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money laundering activities and the 
financing of terrorist and related activities”. Other objectives include: 
• to make information collected by it available to investigating authorities, supervisory 
bodies, the intelligence services and the South African Revenue Services to facilitate the 
administration and enforcement of the laws of the republic; 
• to exchange information with bodies with similar objectives in other countries regarding 
money laundering activities, the financing of terrorist and related activities and other 
similar activities; and 
• to supervise and enforce compliance with the act or any directive made in terms of the 
act and to facilitate effective supervision and enforcement by supervisory bodies.117 
 
It is therefore the responsibility of the centre to gather, consolidate and analyse financial and 
other data in order to disseminate financial intelligence to investigative and law enforcement 
authorities.118  
 In support of the centre’s objectives, the act imposes several obligations on so-called 
                                                     
110  s 23(2). 
111  See Roach (n 36) 143. 
112  38 of 2001. 
113  See s 3.1 above. 
114  s 2-16. 
115  Financial Intelligence Centre Annual Report 2018/19 14. 
116  1 of 1999 (schedule 3, part A). 
117  s 3(2). 
118  Financial Intelligence Centre (n 115) 5. 
 20 
accountable and reporting institutions.119 These institutions are generally susceptible to abuse 
by money launderers, terrorists and terrorism financiers, as their products and services provide 
easy opportunities to obfuscate the origin of funds. Examples include financial institutions such 
as banks, casinos, attorneys, estate agents and dealers in motor vehicles.  
 The obligations that these institutions must comply with are contained in chapter 3 of the 
act – entitled “control measures for money laundering and financing of terrorist and related 
activities”.  
 The most important obligations relate to client (or customer) due diligence.120 Client due 
diligence is aimed at enabling an accountable institution to know who its clients are and to 
understand the nature of the business relationships that are established with them.121 This is 
achieved through client identification and verification measures.122 The resultant client profile 
must enable the accountable institution to identify client behaviour that does not align to this 
profile – and which would therefore be deemed to be “suspicious”. Such suspicious behaviour 
could be indicative of possible abuse of the accountable institution’s products and services for 
purposes of inter alia money laundering or terrorism financing. 
 Other obligations included are the duty to keep records;123 reporting duties and measures 
relating to access to information;124 measures to promote compliance by accountable 
institutions; 125 and sections relating to referral and supervision.126 
 
Targeted financial sanctions 
Compliance with targeted financial sanctions was not included in the original objectives of the 
act and it subsequently did not provide any specific requirements or duties in this regard prior 
to the 2017 amendments. However, the promulgation of POCDATARA, as discussed above, 
had important implications – both notional and formal in nature – for FICA. 
 Firstly, the duty on accountable institutions to “know your client” – as per section 21 of the 
act – was significantly reinforced. In terms of POCDATARA it was an offence to engage with 
listed persons.127 Accountable institutions consequently had to “screen” their clients against 
the UNSC lists, as promulgated under section 25 of POCDATARA, to identify whether a 
                                                     
119  See schedules 1 and 3 of the act respectively. 
120  s 21. The common acronym is “CDD”. 
121  Such due diligence was also commonly referred to as “Know Your Customer” or “KYC”. See also FATF 
recommendation 10 and the interpretive note relating to it.  
122  The common acronym is “CIV”. These CIV measures were prescribed in great detail in section 21 of the act 
as well as in the regulations to the act. Such a prescriptive approach to CIV is known as the rules-based 
approach. The rule-based approach is the application of prescriptive regulations and comprehensive risk 
management and compliance requirements irrespective of the risk related to the particular transactions or party. 
See White “The anti-money laundering complex in the modern era – part II” 2017 The Banking Law Journal 
44-45. This is in contrast to the risk-based approach, which is described in more detail in s 4.1.2 below. 
123  s 22-26. 
124  s 27-41. 
125  s 42-43B. 
126  s 44-45. 
127  See s 3.2.1 above. 
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prospective or existing client was subject to targeted financial sanctions.128 Such screening 
required more comprehensive client identity records, as obtained through the “KYC” process. 
Secondly, POCDATARA brought about amendments to FICA concerning the reporting of 
suspicious and unusual transactions and the reporting of property associated with terrorist and 
related activities.129 The obligation to report suspicious transactions in terms of section 29 was 
extended to include transactions that are known or suspected to be linked to terrorist financing. 
Furthermore, the new section 28A introduced an additional reporting requirement relating to 
inter alia targeted financial sanctions. The section requires the following: 
 
“28A(1). An accountable institution which has in its possession or under its control property owned 
or controlled by or on behalf of, or at the direction of – 
(a) any entity which has committed, or attempted to commit, or facilitated the commission of a 
specified offence as defined in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act, 2004; or 
(b) a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President, under section 25 of the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004, 
must within the prescribed period report that fact and the prescribed particulars to the [Financial 
Intelligence] Centre.” 
 
Any dealings with property that is identified in a report under section 28A of FICA will 
constitute a contravention of section 4 of POCDATARA. In effect, once an institution files a 
report in terms of section 28A, this will lead to a requirement to freeze the property and cease 
to conduct business with the entity in question.130 
 These requirements and amendments somewhat strengthened the targeted financial 
sanctions regime introduced through POCDATARA. However, it was still the case that only 
compliance with terrorism-related targeted financial sanctions was legally required in South 
Africa. South Africa therefore still did not fully meet its obligations in terms of the FATF 
recommendations and the non-terrorism related sanctions issued by the UNSC. 
 
3 2 3  Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act 
The primary objective of the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act131 was to align the 
South African AML/CFT framework more closely to the FATF recommendations – thereby 
also addressing the shortcomings identified in the FATF mutual evaluation report of 2009.132 
This should furthermore enable improvements in the effectiveness of this framework. 
                                                     
128  Screening is a control used in the detection, prevention and disruption of financial crime and, in particular, 
sanctions risk. It is the comparison of one string of text against another to detect similarities which would 
suggest a possible match. It compares data sourced from an institution’s operations, such as customer and 
transactional records, against lists of names and other indicators of sanctioned parties or locations. See 
Wolfsberg Group Guidance on Sanctions Screening (2019) 2. 
129  s 29 and s 28A respectively. 
130  Note the exclusion of s 28A under s 33 (“continuation of transactions”) of FICA. 
131  1 of 2017. 
132  Spruyt “The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Act and the application of a risk-based approach” in 
Hugo and Du Toit (eds) Annual Banking Law Update (2017) 20. See also s 3.1.2 above. 
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 After repeated delays and postponements, the act was eventually signed by the president on 
26 April 2017 and gazetted on 2 May 2017.133 
 
Overview of the act 
The scope of the amendments introduced through the act is wide – including diverse and varied 
new requirements.134 However, most of the amendments can be categorised as relating to client 
due diligence.135  
 The most fundamental change was brought about by the introduction of the risk-based 
approach to client identification and verification. This amendment will be dealt with in greater 
detail below.136 Further to this, several additional aspects to client due diligence was 
introduced. These include inter alia the following: 
• The identification of the natural person who ultimately benefits from his ownership or 
control of a juristic entity (known as the beneficial owner), in order to mitigate the risk 
of such a person abusing the entity to obfuscate his identity or illicit activities;137 
• requirements relating to business relationships with foreign prominent public officials 
and domestic prominent influential persons respectively;138 
• on-going due diligence, which includes on-going monitoring, the periodic refreshing of 
client information and the regular review of certain categories of clients, such as those 
representing a higher risk of money laundering, terrorism financing and related forms of 
financial crime;139 and 
• additional requirements aimed at ensuring that accountable institutions fully understand 
the nature and potential risk posed by their clients.140 
 
Amendments were also introduced with regards to the internal governance of anti-money 
laundering and counter terrorist financing compliance;141 the safeguarding of personal 
information (in line with the requirements of the Protection of Personal Information Act);142 
                                                     
133  The Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill dates back to April 2015 when it was tabled by the treasury 
in parliament. See Hugo & Spruyt (n 61) 228, 233-234 
134  For a complete overview of FICAA, see Spruyt (n 132) 19 et sec and Hugo and Spruyt (n 61) 235-236. 
135  See also s 3.2.2 above. 
136  See s 4.1.2 below. 
137  s 21B. The term “beneficial owner” is defined in s 1. 
138  ss 21F and 21G. The FATF favours the term “politically exposed persons” (PEPs), encompasses both 
“domestic prominent influential persons” (PIPs) and “foreign prominent public officials” – the terms now used 
in FICA. These are individuals who are or have in the past been entrusted with prominent public functions in 
a particular country. The FATF recognises that such persons, as well as their immediate family and close 
associates, may be in a position to abuse their public office for private gain and may use the financial system 
to launder the proceeds of this abuse of office. For these reasons they should be subjected to enhanced risk 
mitigation controls and measures. See the FATF guidance document Politically Exposed Persons 
(Recommendations 12 & 22) (2013). 
139  s 21C, read with ss 21D and 21E. 
140  s 21A. 
141  s 42A. This section requires that an accountable institution establish a “risk management and compliance 
programme” and replaces the previous section 42, which made reference to “internal rules”. The amendment 
primarily drives the implementation of a risk-based approach, as discussed in s 4.1.2 below. 
142  4 of 2013. See s 41A. 
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inspection powers for regulatory compliance purposes;143 and enhanced administrative and 
enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Targeted financial sanctions 
The amendment act places the responsibility to administer the targeted financial sanctions 
measures adopted by the UNSC on the centre.144 Per guidance issued by the centre, this 
inclusion is inter alia a result of recommendation 7, which requires FATF member states to 
implement the targeted financial sanctions issued by the UNSC in the context of combating the 
financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.145 However, UNSC targeted 
financial sanctions can also extend beyond proliferation financing. The act therefore aims to 
also enable South Africa to meet these international obligations.146 
 The act therefore also introduced several important additions to the South African sanctions 
enforcement framework – specifically in terms of chapter 3 of FICA. Now entitled “Money 
laundering, financing of terrorist and related activities and financial sanctions control 
measures”, chapter 3 contains an additional part 2A, relating specifically to targeted financial 
sanctions.147 Substantively similar to the provisions of POCDATARA, this chapter now creates 
a parallel financial sanctions regime. Although similar to the terrorism financing regime, it is 
separate but complementary.148 
 
i. Notification 
Notification of an adopted UNSC resolution that provides for financial sanctions – and 
therefore entails the identification of persons or entities against whom member states must take 
the actions specified in the resolution – must be announced by the minister of finance by notice 
in the Gazette and other appropriate means of publication.149  
 This designation mechanism is clearly similar to section 25 of POCDATARA but pertains 
to financial sanctions which require the identification of listed persons and entities. UNSC 
resolutions contemplated in section 25 of POCDATARA are expressly excluded from the 
scope of this section.150 Furthermore, unlike with section 25 of POCDATARA, there is no 
requirement for such a proclamation to be ratified by Parliament. 
 Following such a notice, the director of the centre must from time to time and by 
appropriate means of publication give notice of persons and entities being identified in a UNSC 
resolution, as well as a decision of the UNSC to no longer apply a resolution to previously 
                                                     
143  s 45A-B. 
144  Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Guidance Note 7: On the implementation of various aspects of the 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001) (2017) par 191. 
145  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 192. See also s 3.1.1 above. 
146  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 192. 
147  s 26A-26C. 
148  De Koker (n 89) 4.16. 
149  s 26A(1). In terms of s 26A(4), the minister may also revoke such a notice if the minister is satisfied that the 
notice is no longer necessary to give effect to financial sanctions. 
150  s 26A(2). 
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identified persons or entities.151 These notices are public statements intended to advise both the 
sanctioned persons and accountable institutions of the sanctions.152 The centre maintains on its 
open website a current list – known as the “targeted financial sanctions” or “TFS” list – 
containing the identifying particulars of UNSC sanctioned persons and entities.153 
 
ii. Screening 
An accountable institution must scrutinise its client records to determine whether it has a 
business relationship with any person or entity mentioned in either the publication of a 
proclamation by the President under section 25 of POCDATARA or notice being given by the 
Director under section 26A(3).154  
 Although the obligation to scrutinise will exist whenever a proclamation is made, 
accountable institutions – and banks in particular – are likely to screen on a more frequent 
basis. Screening should at a minimum take place during the client-take-on process (i.e. 
screening of prospective clients) as well as subsequently as and when the UNSC adopts new 
measures or expands existing ones (i.e. screening of existing clients).155 The centre has 
provided the following guidance in this regard: 
 
“Accountable institutions must therefore determine the likelihood that their client base and 
intended target market may include sanctioned persons or entities. This should assist the 
accountable institution in determining the amount of effort and resources it requires in order to 
determine whether they have sanctioned persons or entities as a clients [sic] or whether prospective 
clients are sanctioned persons or entities. Accountable institutions that have business relationships 
with foreign persons and entities are more vulnerable to dealing with sanctioned persons and 
entities.”156 
 
iii. Offences relating to the provision of property, financial or other service or economic 
support 
Section 26B contains three distinct prohibitions against the provision of financial services or 
economic support to a sanctioned person.157 These prohibitions substantively mirror those of 
section 4 of POCDATARA and will therefore not be repeated here again.158 In short, the 
acquisition, collection or use of the property of persons or an entity subject to targeted financial 
sanctions is broadly prohibited. This includes the provision of financial services and products 
to those persons or entities.159 The centre has issued the following guidance in this regard: 
 
                                                     
151  s 26A(3). 
152  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 195. 
153  https://www.fic.gov.za/International/sanctions/Pages/search.aspx. 
154  s 28A(3). 
155  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 198. 
156  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 199. 
157  s 26B(1)-(3).  
158  See s 3.2.1 above.  
159  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 196. 
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“[T]his means that accountable institutions are not allowed to transact with a sanctioned person or 
entity or to process transactions for such a person or entity. The status quo as at the time of the 
imposition of the sanction in relation property or funds of the sanctioned person or entity must be 
maintained and no financial services may be provided to the person or entity.”160 
 
In other words, the accountable institution must “freeze” or otherwise restrict the property, 
subject only to specific instances which the minister has permitted otherwise.161 As per the 
FATF glossary, the term freeze means to “prohibit the transfer, conversion, disposition or 
movement of any funds or other assets that are owned or controlled by designated persons or 
entities on the basis of, and for the duration of the validity of, an action initiated by the [UNSC] 
or in accordance with applicable [UNSC] resolutions by a competent authority or a court”.  
 The freeze must furthermore be affected “without delay”.162 This phrase means, ideally, 
“within a matter of hours of a designation”.163 The FATF glossary of terms provides the 
following additional interpretive guidance in this regard: 
 
“The phrase should be interpreted in the context of the need to prevent the flight or dissipation of 
funds or other assets which are linked to terrorists, terrorist organisations, those who finance 
terrorism, and to the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the need for 
global, concerted action to interdict and disrupt their flow swiftly.” 
 
Section 26B is applicable to all notifications made in terms of section 26A of FICA, but not to 
notifications made in terms of section 25 or POCDATARA, where section 4 of POCDATARA 
will apply.  
 This section is particularly broad in another sense. These prohibitions apply to designated 
persons and entities, as well as any person acting on behalf of, at the direction of, or to the 
benefit of the listed person. A bank could therefore be under a concomitant obligation to 
identify these additional persons. In the next section, the scope of this obligation is assessed in 
more detail.  
 Lastly, it is important to note that these prohibitions extend to every person and not only 
accountable or reporting institutions.164 
 
 
                                                     
160  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 196. 
161  In accordance with s 26C, the minister can permit a sanctioned person access to property or finances to meet 
detailed basic living expenses, or others necessary in the normal course of business, or that are necessary to 
avoid prejudice to third parties. The permission is granted by the minister in writing to the sanctioned party 
and may contain exact details and conditions to be met. Such permissions are published by the director of 
centre on the centre’s website in accordance with s 26C(4). It should be noted that the act does not explicitly 
require compliance with such a permission.  
162  UN Assets Freeze (n 57) par 1. 
163  FATF Glossary (n 9). 
164  Typically the requirements contained in FICA are only applicable to accountable and reporting institutions, as 
per schedule 1 and 2 of FICA respectively. Section 26B is an exception in this regard. Another example is s29, 
which states that “any person who carries on a business or is in charge of or manages a business or who is 
employed by a business” must report suspicious or unusual transactions. 
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iv. Reporting 
The amendment act expanded the reporting obligation contained in section 28A to require the 
reporting of property that is associated with terrorist and related activities, or that is linked to a 
party identified per either section 25 of POCDATARA or section 26A of FICA.165 The section 
requires the following: 
 
“28A(1). An accountable institution which has in its possession or under its control property owned 
or controlled by or on behalf of, or at the direction of – 
(a) any entity which has committed, or attempted to commit, or facilitated the commission of a 
specified offence as defined in the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist 
and Related Activities Act, 2004; 
(b) a specific entity identified in a notice issued by the President, under section 25 of the 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act, 2004,; 
or 
(c) a person or an entity identified pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council of the United 
Nations contemplated in a notice referred to in section 26A(1), 
must within the prescribed period report that fact and the prescribed particulars to the Centre.” 
 
Where the grounds for reporting under section 28A have not been met, a reporting obligation 
may still exist under section 29. Section 29 contains the obligation to report suspicious and 
unusual transactions and activities. All businesses must in terms of section 29 report suspicious 
or unusual activities or transactions, or series of transactions related to money laundering, the 
financing of terrorist and related activities and contraventions of prohibitions to financial 
sanctions to the centre.166 
 
v. Offences and penalties 
In addition to the administrative sanctions provided for in FICA,167 the act provides for a 
number of offences. Any person who contravenes a provision of section 26B is guilty of an 
offence168 and is liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years or to a fine not 
exceeding R100 million.169 An accountable institution that fails to report property associated 
with terrorist and related activities and financial sanctions in terms of section 28A is also guilty 
of an offence.170 Lastly, failure to report suspicious or unusual transactions within the 
prescribed period is also offence.171 
                                                     
165  See Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Guidance Note 6A: On terrorist financing and terrorist property 
reporting obligations in terms of section 28A of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001) 
par 9-19. 
166  See Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) Guidance Note 4B: On reporting of suspicious and unusual 
transactions and activities to the Financial Intelligence Centre in terms of section 29 of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act, 2001 (Act 38 of 2001) par 103. 
167  s 45C. 
168  s 49A. 
169  s 68. 
170  s 51A. 
171  s 52. 
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3 3  Conclusion 
This section has provided a detailed analysis of the enforcement mechanisms and compliance 
obligations that currently exist with regards to targeted financial sanctions. This regulatory 
framework may be fragmented, but it finally provides full coverage of South Africa’s various 
international obligations as they relate to targeted financial sanctions. 
 The analysis has further shown that the recent amendments to this framework affected 
through FICAA are significant – both for accountable and reporting institutions and persons 
not falling within the scope of these terms. The extremely broad scope of the financing 
prohibitions, together with the various concomitant reporting obligations, results in an onerous 
area of compliance – specifically for banks and other financial services providers.  
 However, there is one particular obligation that implicitly underlies all of these various 
compliance requirements – namely the duty to reasonably identify parties subject to targeted 
financial sanctions. Without effective identification mechanisms, an accountable institution 
would take on significant risk. This is exacerbated by the fact that persons acting on behalf of 
the sanctioned party, or at their direction, should also be identified – adding further to already 
onerous identification requirements. In the following section this duty to identify is analysed 
in greater detail.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE DUTY TO IDENTIFY SANCTIONED PARTIES 
4 1  Standard of due diligence 
The above analysis of the various legal obligations and compliance requirements relating to 
targeted financial sanctions has shown that the duty to accurately and timeously identify 
sanctioned parties is fundamental to ensuring that accountable institutions (or any other person) 
do not provide financial services or economic support to them.  
 It is simple enough to determine whether a prospective or existing client is sanctioned 
through the screening process. However, it is significantly more challenging to determine 
whether a client is acting on behalf of or at the direction of a sanctioned party. Very often the 
accountable institution will not have a direct relationship with such a sanctioned person, 
consequently limiting the amount of identifying particulars that can be utilised.  
 This is especially the case with juristic clients, where convoluted ownership and control 
structures can easily be used to obfuscate the involvement of a sanctioned person. This implies 
a much broader requirement to conduct appropriate due diligence – i.e. an approach not simply 
focused on the primary client relationship. Is it consequently required, for example, to identify 
every single controller and every shareholder – regardless of the percentage shareholding, 
however insignificant – of the juristic entity, lest there be a sanctioned person within this 
corporate structure?  
 Clearly this cannot be the case. It would be unreasonably burdensome – and often 
completely impossible – to perform such detailed due diligence, especially in the case of large 
and complex corporate structures. No accountable institution has the time, expertise or 
resources available to do this – not to mention the extremely negative impact that this would 
have in terms of the customer experience. Furthermore, such an onerous approach would be 
diametrically opposed to the risk-based approach, as discussed in more detail below.  
 To deal with these challenges, it is necessary to identify a standard of due diligence that 
sufficiently mitigates the risk of dealing – either directly or indirectly – with a sanctioned party.  
 
4 1 1  Reasonableness 
Per section 4 of POCDATARA and section 26B of FICA, it is an offence to make property 
available or to provide financial or other services and economic support to a sanctioned party 
if a person “ought reasonably to have known or suspected” that they were dealing with such a 
party. These sections therefore provide for a standard of reasonableness. 
 The question is consequently what would be deemed “reasonable” identifying steps that 
need to be taken? When ought an accountable institution reasonably to have known or 
suspected that it is in fact dealing – either directly or indirectly – with a sanctioned party? And 
conversely, when would it be reasonable to “miss” a link to a sanctioned party? To answer 
these questions, it must first be determined what the meaning of “reasonableness” is within this 
specific context. Thereafter, it can be determined what steps are required to comply with this 
standard. 
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 POCDATARA and FICA (as well as the Prevention of Organised Crime Act (POCA)172 
and the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (PRECCA)173) prescribe the same 
test for knowledge and negligent ignorance.174 In terms of this test, a person had knowledge of 
a fact if he actually knew the fact (“actual knowledge”) or if the court is satisfied that he 
believed that there was a reasonable possibility of the existence of that fact and then failed to 
obtain information to confirm its existence (“wilful blindness”).175 
 A suspicion would only amount to actual knowledge where the suspicion actually amounts 
to a conviction or belief.176 Where this is not the case, but the suspicion is strong enough that 
further enquiries should be made, the suspicious person should do so. A deliberate failure in 
this regard could constitute “wilful blindness”.177 In such a case, relevant knowledge is 
attributed to the person.178 
 If a person fails both legs of the knowledge test, such a person could still be found to be 
negligently ignorant. The test for negligence was introduced in POCA.179 In terms of this test, 
a person is negligent if a reasonably diligent and vigilant person, having both the general 
knowledge, skill, training and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person in the 
position of the particular person, and the general knowledge, skill, training and experience that 
he or she in fact has, would have recognised the illicit nature of the property. Therefore, the 
person ought to have appreciated the nature of the information available to him – but did not 
actually do so. The same test is employed in FICA,180 PRECCA,181 and POCDATARA.182  
 In the targeted sanctions context, one would therefore have to consider the conduct of the 
person responsible for conclusion of client due diligence – which will include the identification 
of any sanctioned party or links to sanctioned parties. The basic question would be whether a 
reasonably diligent and vigilant employee would also have failed to identify the links to the 
sanctioned party. If the person under investigation has particular expertise or knowledge that 
the ordinary employee would not have (such as training in the identification of sanctioned 
persons), this is also imputed to the hypothetical reasonable employee conducting the due 
diligence.183 
 The problem with this approach is that such an employee would practically not have much 
discretion in determining which steps can and should be taken to identify sanctioned parties. 
                                                     
172  121 of 1998. 
173  12 of 2004. 
174  The POCDATARA bill initially prescribed a unique test to ascertain whether a person had knowledge of a 
fact, whereby suspicion was equated with knowledge. However, this was removed and the test was aligned to 
POCA and FICA. 
175  s 1(2) of FICA and 1(6) of POCDATARA. See also s 1(2) of POCA and s 2(1) of PRECCA. 
176  R v Patz 1946 AD 845 857. See also SVV Construction v Attorneys, Notaries & Conveyancers Fidelity 
Guarantee Fund 1993 2 SA 577 (C) 585F-H for the distinction between a belief, a conviction and a suspicion. 
177  Frankel Pollak Vinderine Inc v Stanton NO 1996 2 All SA 582 (W) 596C-D. See also R v 
Myers 1948 1 SA 375 (A).  
178  Stannic v SAMIB Underwriting Managers 2003 3 All SA 257 (SCA) par 17. 
179  s 1(3). 
180  s 1(3). 
181  s 2(2). 
182  s 1(7). 
183  See Savoi v National Director of Public Prosecutions 2014 ZACC 5 par 90-91. See also De Koker (n 89) 3.18. 
 30 
These steps are typically defined and set in the policies that underlie that accountable 
institution’s risk management and compliance programme.184 The question therefore is not so 
much the reasonable conduct of employees, but the reasonableness of the institution’s policy 
requirements as they relate to client due diligence. 
 
4 1 2  Risk-based approach 
These policy requirements used to be referred to as the institution’s internal rules.185 These 
rules related to inter alia the establishment and verification of the identity of persons whom 
the institution must identify in terms of the act.186 These rules were core to the application of a 
“rules-based approach” – i.e. the highly prescriptive and inflexible approach adopted by FICA 
prior to the 2017 amendments.187 
 However, this approach was substituted in its entirety with the fundamentally different 
“risk-based approach” in April 2017, when the amendment act was signed into law. This new 
approach entails the application of risk management resources, controls and other preventative 
measures that are commensurate to the risk being managed.188 Higher areas of risk should 
therefore be the subject of enhanced scrutiny and control, with less strict standards being 
applied to areas of lower risk.189 
 From a client due diligence perspective, the risk-based approach entails that an accountable 
institution’s due diligence requirements should be informed by the risk posed by a specific 
client relationship. Where the risk is higher, the client identification and verification 
requirements should also be stricter and more extensive, to ensure that the institution creates 
an accurate client profile. The higher risk would also inform the nature of on-going due 
diligence, by for example requiring that the client’s information be kept up to date more 
frequently and that the client’s behaviour be monitored more closely. Where the risk is lower, 
less onerous identification and verification requirements may be set, as the lower risk justifies 
a less detailed client profile. Similarly, the client’s behaviour would be monitored less closely.  
 Fundamental to the application of a risk-based approach to client due diligence is the 
accurate assessment of the risk that a client relationship poses.190 There is no standardised 
methodology according to which such a risk assessment should be performed.191 However, it 
is accepted that the following risk indicators should at a minimum inform such an 
assessment:192 
                                                     
184  Per s 42A of FICA. 
185  Section 42 of FICA – prior to the FICAA amendments – set out several requirements for the formulation and 
implementation of internal rules to promote compliance with the act. 
186  s 42(1). 
187  See n 122 above. 
188  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 30. The risk-based approach is provided for in recommendation 1 (“assessing 
risks and applying a risk-based approach”) of the FATF standards (n 62). See also Hugo and Spruyt (n 61) 
233 and n 30. 
189  FIC Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 30-31. 
190  See Hugo & Spruyt (n 61) 240-241. 
191  Spruyt (n 132) 22. 
192  FATF Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: The Banking Sector (2014) and Guidance Note 7 (n 144) par 37-
41. See also Spruyt (n 132) 23-25. 
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• The products and/or services utilised by the client. Clients utilising products and 
services with heightened potential for abuse for money laundering and terrorism 
financing purposes may represent higher risk. For example, transactional banking 
products can be used to facilitate the placement of illicit funds into the financial system 
and the consequent layering of such funds to obfuscate the origin thereof.  
• The geographies or jurisdictions that a client is based in or operating from. Certain 
jurisdictions have deficient AML/CFT frameworks, are known tax havens, or are subject 
to international sanctions. A client based in or operating from such jurisdictions would 
represent heightened risk.  
• The delivery channels or other engagement channels utilised by the client to engage 
with the accountable institution. Generally non-face-to-face interaction is regarded as 
higher risk as it is more difficult to verify a client’s identity.  
• The industry in which the client operates. Examples of high-risk industries include 
dealers in precious metals, stones, scrap metal and second-hand goods; and the sale of 
high-value goods such as art or real estate. These industries are generally characterised 
by high cash-intensity, client anonymity and the high-volume transfer of value. 
• The inherent risk profile of the client. Certain clients automatically represent 
heightened risk, such as politically exposed persons or clients subject to adverse media.193 
 
From a targeted financial sanctions perspective, it is important that sanctions-related risk 
indicators are also included in the assessment of client relationship risk. Such indicators could 
include the following: 
• Examples of high-risk products and/or services include the cross-border transfer of 
funds, for example through correspondent banking services; international trade finance; 
open account payments; downstream clearing services; products that provide the ability 
to obfuscate the identify of either the client or a recipient / beneficiary; and products 
without limitations on non-verified third parties having access to the product. 
• High risk geographies would include jurisdictions subject to international sanctions; 
known sanctions evasion corridors; jurisdictions cited by FATF as having inadequate 
regulatory environments to combat financial crime; and jurisdictions with weak 
transparency requirements for beneficial ownership. Nations that are not UN member 
states should also be regarded as higher risk, as such nations are not bound to comply 
with UN sanctions. It would therefore raise the risk profile of a juristic client if they are 
based or registered in or have branches in such jurisdictions. 
• Delivery channels that represent heightened risk include any method of delivery that 
provides for anonymity; transactions affected through intermediaries; and direct access 
to correspondent accounts.  
• Examples of high-risk industries include clients who trade in sensitive, controlled or 
otherwise embargoed goods; money service businesses (specifically including third-
party payment providers and virtual currency exchanges); and financial services 
                                                     
193  See Hugo & Spruyt (n 61) n 47. 
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providers that are unregistered or otherwise poorly regulated. 
• Inherent client risk indicators include complex juristic entities (i.e. entities with a multi-
layered structure of ownership and/or control); foreign juristic entities, financial 
institutions or trusts; foreign nationals or non-residents from sanctioned or high-risk 
jurisdictions; instrumentalities (e.g. embassies, consulates, missions, etc.) of sanctioned 
governments; and clients that have been convicted of sanctions violations or that are 
otherwise subject to sanctions-related adverse media. 
 
The client’s risk profile should be the result of a holistic assessment of these risk indicators. 
 Against this background, it is submitted that the application of a risk-based approach would 
constitute reasonable due diligence to mitigate sanctions risk where the risk assessment 
informing the due diligence requirements adequately and accurately assesses the risk of 
sanctions exposure. In other words, where the risk posed by a client relationship has been 
accurately assessed as low, it would be reasonable to “miss” a link to a sanctioned party – for 
example by not identifying a sanctioned shareholder. In such a case, the institution “ought not 
reasonably to have known” that such a link existed. This should therefore be a valid defence 
against an alleged violation of either sections 4 of POCDATARA or 26B of FICA.  However, 
where the risk has been assessed as high, the institution would be required to look deeper into 
the corporate structure.  
 
4 2  Minimum client identification and verification requirements 
The position set out in the previous section serves to define the reasonable standard of due 
diligence that should be applied when conducting client identification and verification. In this 
section, this standard of due diligence will be utilised to formulate specific minimum client 
identification and verification requirements that could serve as a point of departure in this 
regard.  
 
i. Primary client 
In accordance with section 21 of FICA, it is a minimum legal requirement to establish and 
verify the identity of the primary client, in accordance with the institution’s risk management 
and compliance programme, when an accountable institution engages with a prospective client 
to enter into a single transaction or to establish a business relationship.194 The primary client 
should consequently also be duly screened against the UNSC sanctions list – both prior to on-
boarding and at regular intervals thereafter. 
 
ii. Acting on behalf of 
Also per section 21 of FICA, it is a minimum legal requirement to establish and verify the 
identity of any person on whose behalf the client is acting, as well as the client's authority to 
establish the business relationship or to conclude the single transaction on behalf of that other 
                                                     
194  s 21(1)(a). 
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person.195 Such a person or persons should consequently also be screened. Thereby the 
accountable institution can at least ensure that the client is not acting on behalf of a sanctioned 
party in terms of the business relationship being established or the single transactions being 
concluded.  
 Similarly, if another person is acting on behalf of the client, the identity of that other person 
and that other person's authority to act on behalf of the client must be established and 
verified.196 That other person should also be screened to ensure that a sanctioned party is not 
acting on behalf of the client.  
 In terms of juristic entity clients, this section ensures that any person mandated to act on 
behalf of the entity is identified and screened. However, the scope of this section should be 
interpreted wider than just formal mandates to act on the entity’s behalf. Where a natural person 
is given the authority to, for example, transact on the entity’s account, such a person could be 
acting on the entity’s behalf. Included would be, for example, secondary credit card holders on 
the account of the juristic entity. Where such a secondary cardholder is sanctioned, transactions 
on the account of the juristic entity would likely result in a violation of section 4 of 
POCDATARA or section 26B of FICA, as applicable – both on the part of the juristic entity 
itself and the accountable institution. 
 However, a possible distinction could be made between mandated persons acting on their 
own accord and persons mandated to affect transactions on the account of the client in 
accordance with specific instructions. Where a person simply processes payment instructions 
issued by their employer, and is mandated to do so on the banking profile, this will likely not 
result in any sanctions violations. Such persons could therefore be excluded from the due 
diligence requirements and consequent screening, on the basis of a risk-based approach. 
 In terms of natural person clients, the same principles would apply. Where another person 
is mandated to utilise the accounts of the client – for example through a secondary credit card 
or rights to access and use the client’s online profile – such a person should be identified and 
screened. If this were not the case, a sanctioned party could easily usurp the client’s products 
and services and effectively act both autonomously and anonymously. 
 
iii. Ownership 
FICA imposes several requirements in relation to the owners of and shareholders in juristic 
entity clients. If a client contemplated in section 21 is a legal person or a natural person acting 
on behalf of a partnership, trust or similar arrangement between natural persons, an accountable 
institution must, in accordance with its risk management and compliance programme, establish 
the ownership structure of the client.197 This information enables the identification and 
screening of two classes of owners: 
 Firstly, the accountable institution must identify and screen the beneficial owner. The act 
defines a beneficial owner, in respect of a legal person, as “a natural person who, independently 
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or together with another person, directly or indirectly, owns the legal person or exercises 
effective control of the legal person”.198 If a client contemplated in section 21 is a legal person, 
the following requirements are applicable:199 
 
“21B(2) If a client contemplated in section 21 is a legal person, an accountable institution must, in 
addition to the steps required under sections 21 and 21A and in accordance with its Risk 
Management and Compliance Programme – 
(a) establish the identity of the beneficial owner of the client by – 
(i) determining the identity of each natural person who, independently or together with 
another person, has a controlling ownership interest in the legal person; 
(ii) if in doubt whether a natural person contemplated in subparagraph (i) is the 
beneficial owner of the legal person or no natural person has a controlling ownership 
interest in the legal person, determining the identity of each natural person who 
exercises control of that legal person through other means; or 
(iii) if a natural person is not identified as contemplated in subparagraph (ii), determining 
the identity of each natural person who exercises control over the management of 
the legal person, including in his or her capacity as executive officer, non-executive 
director, independent non-executive director, director or manager; and 
(b) take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner of the client, so that 
the accountable institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is.” 
 
The act therefore provides for three alternative steps to identify a beneficial owner: first in 
terms of ownership interest; thereafter in terms of control; and finally, in terms of control over 
management. However, it should be noted that the accountable institution cannot choose the 
option that best suits it – it must fail in terms of each step before it can move on to the next.  
 The following are similar requirements applicable to partnerships:  
 
“21B(3). If a natural person, in entering into a single transaction or establishing a business 
relationship as contemplated in section 21, is acting on behalf of a partnership between natural 
persons, an accountable institution must, in addition to the steps required under sections 21 
and 21A and in accordance with its Risk Management and Compliance Programme – 
(a) establish the identifying name of the partnership, if applicable; 
(b) establish the identity of every partner, including every member of a partnership en 
commandite, an anonymous partnership or any similar partnership; 
(c) establish the identity of the person who exercises executive control over the partnership; 
(d) establish the identity of each natural person who purports to be authorised to enter into a 
single transaction or establish a business relationship with the accountable institution on 
behalf of the partnership; 
(e) take reasonable steps to verify the particulars obtained in paragraph (a); and 
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(f) take reasonable steps to verify the identities of the natural persons referred to in 
paragraphs (b) to (d) so that the accountable institution is satisfied that it knows the 
identities of the natural persons concerned.”200 
 
Lastly, the following similar requirements apply to trusts: 
 
“21B(4). If a natural person, in entering into a single transaction or establishing a business 
relationship as contemplated in section 21, is acting in pursuance of the provisions of a trust 
agreement between natural persons, an accountable institution must, in addition to the steps 
required under sections 21 and 21A and in accordance with its Risk Management and 
Compliance Programme – 
(a) establish the identifying name and number of the trust, if applicable; 
(b) establish the address of the Master of the High Court where the trust is registered, if 
applicable; 
(c) establish the identity of the founder; 
(d) establish the identity of– 
(i) each trustee; and 
(ii) each natural person who purports to be authorised to enter into a single transaction 
or establish a business relationship with the accountable institution on behalf of the 
trust; 
(e) establish– 
(i) the identity of each beneficiary referred to by name in the trust deed or other 
founding instrument in terms of which the trust is created; or 
(ii) if beneficiaries are not referred to by name in the trust deed or other founding 
instrument in terms of which the trust is created, the particulars of how the 
beneficiaries of the trust are determined; 
(f) take reasonable steps to verify the particulars obtained in paragraphs (a), (b) and (e)(ii); 
and 
(g) take reasonable steps to verify the identities of the natural persons referred to in 
paragraphs (c), (d) and (e)(i) so that the accountable institution is satisfied that it knows 
the identities of the natural persons concerned.”201 
 
These requirements apply in respect of a legal person, partnership or trust or a similar 
arrangement between natural persons, whether it is incorporated or originated in South Africa 
or elsewhere.202 
 It is submitted that the beneficial owner should be identified on the basis of the ownership 
structure that has already been established, in accordance with section 21(B)(1)(b), as discussed 
above.  
 In each of these respective scenarios it is therefore a minimum legal requirement to identify 
– and consequently screen – the beneficial owner of a juristic entity.  
 The second class of owners can be described as “significant owners” – i.e. the extent of 
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their ownership interests in the juristic entity is significant enough for them to exert control 
over it. If such a shareholder is sanctioned, such control enables them to utilise the entity for 
their own purposes whilst acting largely anonymously.  
 However, it is challenging to set thresholds for what would constitute significant 
ownership – and the legislature and regulators in South Africa have avoided doing so. 
Fortunately, international best practice and foreign sanctions-related thresholds can assist in 
this regard.  
 The first threshold is a logical one: ownership interests of 50% and higher are always 
significant. With 50% ownership, a person can effectively control the entity. This is further 
strengthened by the so-called “50%-rule” applied by the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(hereafter “OFAC”) in the United States. OFAC – which falls under the U.S. Department of 
the Treasury – administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign 
policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, 
international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or 
economy of the United States.203 The 50%-rule states that the property and interests in property 
of entities directly or indirectly owned 50% or more in the aggregate by one or more persons 
subject to U.S. targeted financial sanctions are also considered blocked, regardless of whether 
such entities have been sanctioned in their own right.204 It is therefore extremely important for 
financial institutions that must comply with U.S. targeted sanctions (which includes most South 
African banks) to not only identify U.S. sanctioned clients, but also whether their juristic clients 
are in fact owned 50% or more by a person sanctioned by the U.S. The European Union has 
adopted the same threshold for purposes of its targeted sanctions regimes.205 On the basis of 
the above, a 50% threshold is clearly important. Any shareholder holding a 50% or higher 
ownership interest in the juristic client should therefore be identified and screened.206  
 The second ownership threshold that is widely utilised is 25%. The centre itself has stated 
that “ownership of 25% or more of the shares with voting rights in a legal person is usually 
sufficient to exercise control of the legal person”.207 This is echoed internationally. For 
example, according to FinCEN (the U.S. equivalent of the Financial Intelligence Centre), a 
beneficial owner is defined as inter alia “each individual, if any, who, directly or indirectly, 
through any contract, arrangement, understanding, relationship or otherwise, owns 25% or 
more of the equity interests of a legal entity customer”.208 Similarly, in terms of the 4th Anti-
Money Laundering Directive of the European Union, the beneficial owner is defined in the 
case of corporate entities as the “natural person who ultimately owns or controls, directly or 
indirectly, more than 25% of the shares or voting rights, or controls the entity through other 
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means”.209 On this basis, any person with an ownership interest of 25% or higher in the juristic 
client should also be identified and screened.  
 Lastly, it is submitted that a threshold of lower than 25% – such as 10% – should be 
considered for high risk clients, where the risk is high enough to justify this. 
 
iv. Control 
Lastly, if a client contemplated in section 21 is a legal person or a natural person acting on 
behalf of a partnership, trust or similar arrangement between natural persons, an accountable 
institution must, in accordance with its risk management and compliance programme, also 
establish the control structure of the client.210  
 The information gathered to comply with this requirement should enable the identification 
of persons exercising significant control over the entity. This would typically include the 
directors of the entity and could include the top-level management, where the risk justifies this.  
 Persons identified as significant controllers should consequently also be screened.  
  
4 3  Conclusion 
The analysis in this section firstly showed that the risk-based approach fundamentally informs 
the standard of due diligence applicable to clients. This implies that not all clients should be 
treated the same from a client identification and verification perspective. This further implies 
that for some low risk clients, an accountable institution would not have established enough 
identifying datapoints or information to ensure that the risk of dealing with a sanctioned person 
is sufficiently reduced. However, due to the low risk posed by the client, this should be deemed 
to be reasonable. The nature of the risk-based approach – and the risk-informed decisioning 
that it enables – should justify this for the sake of effective risk management.  
 Within the context of targeted financial sanctions compliance, due diligence therefore 
refers to the risk-informed, sensible and methodical process of appraising information. On this 
basis, the risk management decisions made by the accountable institution can satisfy the 
reasonableness threshold set by section 4 of POCDATARA and 26B of FICA respectively. 
 However, the application of the risk-based approach does not enable a “free-for-all”.211 In 
this regard, the minimum requirements and guiding principles identified and discussed in this 
section should serve as a point of departure to effectively mitigate the risk of engaging with a 
sanctioned party.  
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